Reapportionment and Party Realignment in the American States by Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M., Jr.
(433)
REDISTRICTING:  CASE LAW
AND CONSEQUENCES
REAPPORTIONMENT AND PARTY REALIGNMENT
IN THE AMERICAN STATES
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE
JAMES M. SNYDER, JR.†
Malapportionment of state legislatures before the mid-1960s gave urban and
suburban voters much less representation than they deserved.  This Essay docu-
ments that suburban and urban voters had markedly different policy preferences,
party identifications, and partisan voting behaviors than voters in rural areas,
who were overrepresented.  However, the patterns were not uniform.  In the North-
east and North Central, the suburban and urban underrepresented areas were
much more Democratic than rural areas.  In the South and West, the rural voters
leaned more Democratic than the urban and suburban voters.  Policy preferences
split differently in the Northeast and North Central than they did in the South
and West.  Urban and suburban voters were much more liberal on social welfare
and economic policy than rural voters in these areas.  In the South and West, few
differences existed across locales.  On only one issue did the urban and suburban
areas have more liberal attitudes throughout the nation:  racial politics.  Court-
ordered reapportionment thus increased the political weight of liberals and Demo-
crats in the Northeast and North Central, but not in the South and West.  Reap-
portionment moved the median voter in all regions to the left on issues of civil
rights and racial policy.
INTRODUCTION
Reapportionment of state legislatures during the 1960s radically
altered representation in the United States.  Throughout the first half
of the twentieth century, despite state constitutional requirements for
population-based representation, most state legislatures either re-
quired representation of area as well as people or neglected to draw
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new district boundaries.  As a result, representation in state legisla-
tures failed to reflect much of the growth in urban and suburban ar-
eas that occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.  By 1960, dramatic differences existed in at least one chamber
of almost all state legislatures.  In California, for example, Los Angeles
county had one state senate seat for its six million people and the
three smallest counties in the state, with a combined population of
14,000 people, shared a senator.1  In Connecticut, Hartford had two
state representatives for its 162,000 residents, while Union had two
representatives for its 400 residents.2  Through a series of significant
court cases, beginning with Baker v. Carr,3 the U.S. Supreme Court
forced the states to eliminate these disparities by the end of the
1960s.4
The sudden decline in rural political power in state legislatures
had broad effects on public policies.  Equalization of representation
altered the distribution of public spending across areas within the
states.  Overrepresented areas had long gained a disproportionate
share of public expenditures because of their advantaged political po-
sitions.  That vanished once representation was equalized.5  It was
natural to believe that the “liberal urban agenda” would succeed in
other policy matters as well.  Surprisingly, a broad shift in public pol-
icy in the states cannot be traced to reapportionment, and several
scholars have, in fact, found little or no evidence that malapportion-
ment affected the overall liberalness of state policy, including overall
levels of expenditure and labor regulation.6  The exception is civil
1
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT:  THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 46-47 tbl. (1965) (Comparative Data on the Composition of State
Legislative Districts During [the] 1963 and/or 1964 Sessions).
2
Id. at 48.
3
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4
For an excellent summary of these cases, their progression, and the legal and
constitutional issues involved, see DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW:  CASES
AND MATERIALS 71-113 (1995).
5
See Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber & James Snyder, Equal Votes, Equal
Money:  Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States,  96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 767, 776 (2002) (“Within 15 years of the Baker ruling, the doctrine of
one-person, one-vote resulted in a substantial equalization of the distribution of public
funds within states.”).
6
See Thomas R. Dye, Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States, 27 J. POL. 586,
599-601 (1965) (“The impact of reapportionment on public policy, however, may be
somewhat less sweeping than many expect.”); George H. Fredrickson & Yong Hyo Cho,
Legislative Apportionment and Fiscal Policy in the American States, 27 W. POL. Q. 5, 32-37
(1974) (“Great changes in apportionment, it appears, slow the process of change in
spending patterns.”); Herbert Jacob, The Consequences of Malapportionment:  A Note of
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rights legislation, which a pair of studies by Robert Erikson suggest
may have enjoyed increased support in state legislatures outside the
South as a result of reapportionment.7
In this Essay, we examine the effects of reapportionment on the
political parties.  At the time, it was conjectured that Democrats and
liberals would see the greatest political gains because urban areas tend
to be the most Democratic and usually had the least state legislative
representation.  Democratic, labor, and liberal political organizations
provided much of the political activism in support of reapportion-
ment.8  Erikson has also examined the effects of malapportionment
on party control of non-southern state legislatures that were substan-
tially malapportioned.9  In general, he concludes, Democrats tended
to gain.10  However, only half of the chambers analyzed showed sub-
stantively large effects, and some states saw significant Republican
gains.11  Subsequent studies have found similarly small net gains for
the Democrats in the wake of reapportionment.  Across the nation,
Democrats seemed to have gained about three percent more state leg-
islative seats.12  This lack of party effects has been a cause of some de-
bate, with partisan gerrymandering often blamed for the weak Demo-
cratic gains.13
Caution, 43 SOC. FORCES 256, 260-61 (1964) (“If malapportionment has a widespread
effect on state politics, it is a good deal more subtle than we have hitherto thought.”).
7
Erikson argues that outside the South, Democratic control led to a higher rate of
passage of civil rights legislation.  Robert S. Erikson, The Relationship Between Party Con-
trol and Civil Rights Legislation in the American States, 24 W. POL. Q. 178, 181 tbl.2 (1971).
In a separate paper, he shows that reapportionment increased Democratic representa-
tion in the North and Midwest.  Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment, Gerrymandering,
and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1234, 1244 (1972)
(“The pre-1966 overrepresentation of northern Republicans in Congress resulted from
a Republican ‘gerrymander.’”).
8
See, e.g., WARD E.Y. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 252 (1974)
(“The reapportionment cases brought an unprecedented display of the Court’s con-
stituencies in action . . . [and] everybody had some kind of spokesman except the gen-
eral public . . . .”).
9 See Robert S. Erikson, The Partisan Impact of State Legislative Reapportionment, 15
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 57, 58 (1971) (detailing his study).
10
Id. at 70.
11
Id. at 65; see Bruce W. Robeck, Legislative Partisanship, Constituency and Malappor-
tionment:  The Case of California, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1246, 1250 (1972) (noting that
“Republican districts became ‘safer’ politically after reapportionment, while districts
controlled by Democrats were relatively less secure”).
12
Erikson, supra note 9, at 64.
13
See, e.g., GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER:
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 213 (2002)
(“[R]edrawn Republican-held districts tended to show a large variance in [Demo-
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Two puzzles emerge from past research.  First, why did the Demo-
crats make only modest gains following Baker, given the enormous
underrepresentation of cities in state legislatures?  Second, why are
the policy effects of reapportionment limited to civil rights and the
distribution of public expenditures?  Uneven policy changes and weak
Democratic gains reflected, we believe, the nature of malapportion-
ment throughout the country prior to Baker.  While partisan gerry-
mandering and related monkey business probably contributed some,
much of the pattern of policy shift and partisan shift can be under-
stood in terms of three factors:  who was underrepresented, where,
and what they believed.
To answer these questions, we examine the contours of electoral
behavior and citizens’ policy attitudes across the regions and parties in
the decades leading up to the implementation of the one person, one
vote standard.  We examine aggregate data on state election returns
and the structure of legislative districts to measure the partisan effects
of malapportionment.  We examine the National Election Studies
(NES) from 1952 to 1968 to map the policy preferences of urban,
suburban, and rural voters living in different regions.14
These data show that there was one “realignment revolution,” not
many.  Malapportionment in the state legislatures regularly followed
the contours of population, with rural areas having disproportionately
more state legislative representation.  However, the partisanship and
political orientations of rural, suburban, and urban communities var-
ied across states and regions.
We discern four distinct regional patterns of partisan underrepre-
sentation that are attributable to malapportionment.  In the South,
cratic] vote share relative to otherwise comparable but untouched districts.”).
14
NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, 1952:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999),
available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1952/nes1952.htm; NAT’L
ELECTION STUDIES, 1956:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at
http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1956/nes1956.htm; NAT’L ELECTION
STUDIES, 1958:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at http://
www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1958/nes1958.htm; NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES,
1960:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at http://www.umich.edu/
~nes/studyres/nes1960/nes1960.htm; NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, 1962:  POST-ELECTION
STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1962/
nes1962.htm; NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, 1964:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset)
(1999), available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1964/nes1964.htm;
 NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, 1966:  POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at
http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes1966/nes1966.htm; NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES,
1968:  PRE-/POST-ELECTION STUDY (dataset) (1999), available at http://www.umich.edu/
~nes/studyres/nes1968/nes1968.htm.
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malapportionment advantaged the Democrats, because rural areas
voted much more Democratic than urban areas.  In the Northeast and
North Central, malapportionment tended to advantage Republicans,
because rural areas in these regions voted heavily Republican while
urban areas voted Democratic.  In the West, a more mixed picture
emerges, and the differences between urban and rural are less pro-
nounced than in other regions.
Political orientations and policy preferences also varied across
regions and locales.  Southern rural voters, who were overrepresented
throughout the South, tended to be very conservative; northern urban
voters, who were underrepresented in their regions, tended to be very
liberal.  The differences between northern and southern voters are
well known, but not exactly relevant.  The more meaningful compari-
son is within each region.  How did these voters compare to other par-
tisans across geographic locales within their respective regions?  Were
urban and suburban southerners, for example, more liberal than ru-
ral southerners?  Such would have to be the case for reapportionment
to affect public policy by realigning the electorate represented in the
state legislatures.
Some important differences did exist.  However, the patterns are
such that the policy implications of reapportionment varied across re-
gions and across areas of public policy.  Both within the parties and in
the electorate as a whole, different political geography correlated dif-
ferently with ideological belief and policy liberalism across regions.  In
the Northeast and North Central, reapportionment had the greatest
potential to shift policy to the left; in the West, there was no such po-
tential.
The potential to shift policy, we document, came from two en-
gines.  First, reapportionment had the potential to shift the locus of
the median voter in the state legislative electorate as a whole.  The av-
erage voter in many regions was much more liberal than the overrep-
resented rural voter.  Second, reapportionment had the potential to
move the political parties.  Urban and rural voters within the Demo-
cratic Party differed substantially on most issues of the day.  The Re-
publicans were not similarly split.  Reapportionment in the mid-1960s
likely fueled the divisions within the Democratic Party–-divisions over
race, labor relations, education, and economic policy—that events
and organizations were pushing to the fore of the national political
agenda.
In the pages that follow we document these patterns using a mix
of aggregate and survey data.  Our goal is less to estimate the effects
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on specific policy changes and more to document the patterns of
malapportionment as they relate to the representation of political
preferences.  Ultimately, we argue that reapportionment produced
four different regional patterns of partisan realignment.  In the
Northeast and North Central, reapportionment shifted politics toward
the Democrats and the Left.  In the South, reapportionment shifted
politics toward the Republicans, but not assuredly to the Right, and on
issues of race the shift was in the liberal direction.  In the West, reap-
portionment had little immediate partisan and ideological impact.
I. REPRESENTATION AND PARTISANSHIP
In the first step of our study we attempt to demonstrate how ine-
qualities of representation related to partisanship prior to Baker.
Malapportionment produced partisan advantages to the extent that
rural and urban areas within states and regions had differing party at-
tachments.  By far the most important factor explaining malappor-
tionment was population distribution.  Rapid urban population
growth created a rural backlash in the early twentieth century that
produced constitutional and legal measures designed to guarantee
overrepresentation of rural interests.15  Typically states adopted rules
that gave each county at least one seat in each chamber.16  Malappor-
tionment, then, advantaged voters in rural areas, whatever their politi-
cal leaning.17  State legislatures and constitutional conventions some-
times magnified these advantages further through gerrymandering
that gave the minority party especially few seats.
New York State is a case in point.  In 1894, New York convened a
constitutional convention to revise its constitution.  The convention
was dominated by Republicans, who wrote boundaries for the new leg-
islative districts into the new constitution.18  A coalition of Republicans
15
See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:  REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAW AND POLITICS 58-90 (1968) (providing a historical account of representational
disparities in state legislatures).
16
See id. at 83-85 (describing geographically based apportionment constraints in
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Montana); id. at 86-87 chart 4 (summarizing ap-
portionment formulas of state legislatures in 1961).
17
See MCKAY, supra note 1, at 55 (describing the consequences of malapportion-
ment); Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. & Jonathan Woon, Why Did a Ma-
jority of Californians Vote to Limit Their Own Power? 5-6 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript) (explaining how California voters supported “one-county-one-vote” de-
spite the disadvantages to populous counties), available at http://web.mit.edu/
polisci/research/representation/apsa_99_v2.pdf.
18
See 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
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from rural and urban areas (especially Buffalo) and rural Democrats
allotted New York City far fewer seats than it deserved.19  Republicans
from New York City went along with the plan, which was approved in a
straight party vote, because the plan strengthened the party in the
state legislature.20  The plan also gerrymandered the city to create ad-
ditional Republican seats, one of which covered an area four city
blocks wide and eighty long.21
One measure of the relationship between partisanship and
malapportionment is the correlation between relative representation
and the extent of the Democratic tendencies of counties within states.
Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg constructed a measure of repre-
sentation as a county’s fraction of state legislative seats divided by that
county’s fraction of the total state population.22  If a county’s share of
legislative seats equals its share of the state’s population then the in-
dex equals 1.0.  Ratios higher than 1.0 mean that the county has more
representation than it deserves; ratios less than 1.0 mean that the
county has less representation than it deserves.  We call this measure
the Relative Representation Index (RRI).  We study 1960, the last year
David and Eisenberg measured RRI prior to the Baker decision.
The RRI is highly skewed.23  To reduce the skew we convert this
index to the logarithmic scale, which implies that “fair” representation
has a logarithm of RRI of 0.0.  The logarithm of RRI has a mean of
0.31 and a variance of 0.58 for state representative elections, and a
mean of 0.29 and a variance of 0.58 for state senate elections.
We construct a similar measure of the propensity of a county to
vote Democratic.  We calculate the Relative Democratic Vote (RDV)
of the county as the average Democratic vote for President, U.S. Sena-
tor, and governor in the county over the last two elections, divided by
the average Democratic vote in the state for the same period.  RDV
equals 1.0 when a county has vote share equal to the state average.
Values above 1.0 mean that the county is more Democratic than the
649-52, 713-19 (1894) (detailing the convention’s composition); 3 id. at 997 et seq.
(floor debates); 4 id. at 663 (same).
19
3 id. at 1067-77.
20
4 id. at 694.
21
4 id. at 49-50.
22
PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND
SUBURBAN VOTE 6 (1961).
23
The skew of a variable is the extent to which the observations are distributed
asymmetrically about the mean.  A symmetric distribution, such as a bell-shaped curve,
has no skew.  The skew is measured as the average of the cubed deviation from the
mean.
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state; values below 1.0 mean that the county is more Republican than
the state.  This measure is centered at 1.0, with a variance of 0.02 and
a symmetric distribution.
The correlation between RRI and RDV captures the extent to
which malapportionment favored Democratic counties.  We estimated
the correlation between RDV and the log of RRI for the upper and
lower chambers of each legislature.  A handful of states, such as Con-
necticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island, have a small number of coun-
ties and have town-level representation.  We omit these from the
analysis, though town-level analysis yields a similar pattern.  Figure 1
presents the correlations of representation and partisanship for the
upper and lower chambers of each state’s legislature in 1960, immedi-
ately before Baker.
Figure 1:  Representation and Partisanship in State Legislatures24
-.75 -.5 -.2 .2 .5 .75
-.75
-.5
-.2
0
.2
.5
.75
Correlation Between Vote and Representation in Upper Chamber
0
AL
AR
CA
CO
FLGA
IA
ID
ILIN
KS
KY
LA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI
WV
WY
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Be
tw
ee
n 
Av
er
ag
e 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 V
ot
e
an
d 
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 L
ow
er
 C
ha
m
be
r
The correlation between representation and partisanship captures
the partisan advantage created by malapportionment.  Two patterns
24
Figure 1 is based on our analysis of the data in DAVID & EISENBERG, supra note
22.  Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the data as they became states in 1959.  Ne-
braska is omitted because it has a nonpartisan, unicameral legislature.
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emerge.  First, there is a strong positive relationship between the par-
tisan advantage in one chamber and the partisan advantage in the
other chamber.  The more malapportionment advantages a party in
the lower chamber, the more it advantages that party in the upper
chamber.  The only clear exception is California, where the state sen-
ate represented counties and the assembly represented population.
The Democratic cities, especially Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Oakland, were badly underrepresented in the senate, creating a Re-
publican bias.  In the assembly, San Francisco was overrepresented,
creating a Democratic bias in 1960.
Second, there are several distinctive regional patterns.  The South
exhibited strong positive correlations between RDV and representa-
tion, suggesting that malapportionment advantaged Democratic coun-
ties in the South.  In the Northeast and much of the Midwest, malap-
portionment tended to favor Republican counties.  The West and
Upper Midwest (i.e., Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Wis-
consin) showed weaker partisan effects overall.
Survey data provide further evidence of the regional flavor of the
partisan nature of malapportionment.  The NES measures the party
identification and geographic location of respondents as far back as
1948.25  Owing to small sample sizes, it is impossible to estimate the
party identifications of people in different areas within the 50 states.
However, pooling the data from 1952 to 1968, we can construct rea-
sonably precise estimates of the partisanship of urban, suburban, and
rural voters in each of the four census regions:  the Northeast, the
North Central, the South, and the West.26
To make the NES party identification measure comparable over
time, we standardized the traditional 7-point measure by subtracting
the mean of the variable in the survey in each year and dividing by the
standard deviation of the variable in each year.  In other words, we
have subtracted out any trend in the variable and put each year on the
same scale.  Our measure has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation
of 100.  A partisanship score of 50, for example, means that the parti-
sanship of an area is one-half of one standard deviation above the
overall mean of the item (in a given year throughout the nation).
25
NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, 1948-2002 CUMULATIVE DATA FILE (dataset) (2001),
available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/nes48_02/nes48_02.htm.
26
The Northeast contains CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT; the North
Central contains IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, and WI; the South
contains AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, and WV;
and the West contains AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, and WY.
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The standardized party identification measure for each type of locality
and each region are shown in Table 1.  Within each region party iden-
tifications differed significantly across locales.
Table 1:  Standardized Party Identification
by Region and Locality, 1952-196827
Northeast
North
Central South West
Urban
Suburban
Rural
13
-28
-49
14
-20
-23
32
21
31
-2
-9
11
As with the aggregate data, the survey data show sharply different
partisan alignments across locales in the different regions at the time
of reapportionment.
The Northeast and the North Central regions exhibited similar
partisan divisions.  Rural residents of the Northeast and North Cen-
tral, who tended to be overrepresented within their states, had strong
Republican attachments.  Indeed, these were the most Republican ar-
eas in the nation.  Northern suburbanites tended to identify with the
Republicans as well.  Urban residents in the North, who were under-
represented, leaned Democratic.  As with the aggregate data, survey
responses from northern states showed a negative correlation between
Democratic identification and representation (locale).
Southerners had the strongest allegiance to the Democratic Party
relative to the rest of the nation at the time of reapportionment.  The
most Republican areas within the South—the suburban areas—were
underrepresented.  However, although reapportionment in the South
would probably have shifted states in the Republican direction, even
the underrepresented areas leaned Democratic.
Westerners showed the least partisan division across locales.  In
the West, rural voters were the most Democratic and suburban voters
the most Republican.  Reapportionment in the West, then, likely in-
creased Republican representation somewhat.
27
Table 1 is based on our analysis of data available from the NES 1948-2002
CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 25.
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Of note, we are not arguing that the underrepresentation of one
party or another through malapportionment was intentional.  At
times, malapportionment was part of a partisan gerrymander, such as
with the new districts created by New York State in its 1894 constitu-
tion.28  More often, however, malapportionment was driven by other
factors or was simply a historical accident.  For example, the appor-
tionment of the Connecticut legislature traced to that state’s 1818
constitution, predating the Industrial Revolution.29  Town populations
at that time were roughly equal in New England, and town representa-
tion saved the state the complications of a census.30  The partisan and
ideological implications of such arrangements a century later could
not be foreseen.31
In many states, however, malapportionment intentionally
squelched the voices of some groups.  The most infamous cases came
from the South, where Black Belt counties were given less representa-
tion so as to limit their political influence.32  Black voters also tended
to be Republican.33  In the northeastern and midwestern states, like
New York and Michigan, malapportionment was intended to limit the
vote of urban Democrats and liberals.34  Finally, many states acted to
restrain the growing influence of major cities rather than out of parti-
sanship.  In 1926, for example, California voters approved a one-
county-one-vote plan for the state senate in order to contain the grow-
ing political influence of Los Angeles, which accounted for forty per-
28
See MCKAY, supra note 1, at 53 (concluding that “the New York Constitution of
1894 has long made it easier for Republicans to retain control of the legislature”).
29
See id. at app. 294-95 (locating the roots of Connecticut’s apportionment plan,
which limited the number of town representatives to two, in the Connecticut Constitu-
tion of 1818 and the Fundamental Orders of 1638-1639).
30
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, APPOR-
TIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES 8 (1962) (citing Rhode Island as an example of a
state where town-based representation was acceptable due to small relative differences
in town population across the state).
31
See MCKAY, supra note 1, at 148 (stating that by the mid-twentieth century,
“there was a differential of 424.5 to 1” between the number of voters represented by
the representative from the least populous town to the most populous town).
32
V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 537-38 (1949) (listing several methods
southern states used to disenfranchise blacks, such as residency requirements, poll
taxes, literacy tests, registration deadlines, and other disqualification strategies).
33
See id. at 540 (stating that black voters tended to vote in “racial solidarity” for the
Republican Party).
34
See generally Karl A. Lamb, Michigan Legislative Apportionment:  Key to Constitutional
Change, in THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT 267 (Malcolm E. Jewell ed., 1962) (de-
scribing Michigan’s apportionment scheme and the state constitutional convention of
1961-1962); text accompanying notes 18-21 (discussing the case of New York).
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cent of the state’s population by 1930.35  As Los Angeles happened to
be close to the median voter in the state in terms of partisanship in
the 1920s, some have attributed the apportionment scheme to interest
in “distributive concerns” and state budget expenditures.36
Baker and subsequent cases concerned the representation of
population rather than the partisan effects of malapportionment.
Both the survey and aggregate data reveal the varied implications for
reapportionment across the country.  Democrats stood to gain legisla-
tive representation in the Northeast and North Central but to lose it
in the South.  It is little wonder that the Democratic Party establish-
ment in Tennessee, Florida, and other southern states fought attempts
to reapportion their states throughout the 1950s and 1960s.37  Only in
the West did malapportionment have little regular relationship to
representation of the parties.38
II. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PARTIES
A. Reapportionment Divided the Parties as Much as It Improved Their
Electoral Positions Vis-a-Vis Their Opponents
Tennessee provides a telling pattern of internal party division due
to reapportionment.  In 1962, when the Court decided Baker, Tennes-
see had not reapportioned its legislature for more than sixty years,
since 1901.39  Population growth in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville,
and Chattanooga meant that these cities had fewer legislative seats
than they deserved.40  In addition, the rural eastern parts of the state,
35
See MCKAY, supra note 1, at 190 (discussing how rural groups in California
joined with groups from the northern part of the state to prevent a southern majority
in the 1920s).  As a result of the “one-county-one-vote” plan, Los Angeles had the same
level of representation as towns that its population outnumbered by 500 to 1.  Id.
36
See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 17, at 3 (“A majority in California chose a
senate apportionment in order to increase the likelihood that their representatives
would be pivotal members of the winning coalitions that determined the distribution
of public expenditures.”).
37
See, e.g., WILLIAM C. HAVARD & LOREN P. BETH, THE POLITICS OF MIS-
REPRESENTATION 41-82 (1962) (finding that intense debate raged around reappor-
tionment plans in 1950s Florida because Democrats had a great deal to lose if the rural
areas’ representation was reduced); see also MCKAY, supra note 1, at 51 (finding that
many states refused to reapportion in spite of state requirements to do so).
38
See supra p. 442 & tbl.1 (containing the authors’ analysis of partisan alignment
data and describing the relatively minimal effects of reapportionment in the West).
39
MCKAY, supra note 1, at 71.
40
See id. at 71-72 & n.44 (noting that the population shift from rural to urban ar-
eas, compounded with the quadrupling of eleigible voters in Tennessee, resulted in
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which had strong Republican allegiance since the Civil War, were also
underrepresented.41  Central and western rural counties held the ma-
jority of seats, though they did not have a majority of the population.42
These counties voted overwhelmingly Democratic, and they domi-
nated the state legislature.43  While Republican areas picked up some
seats from reapportionment in these areas, the Democratic cities—
Nashville and Memphis—gained even more.  By the 1970s, the cities
came to represent a greater proportion of Democratic seats in Ten-
nessee.44
This pattern varied across regions.  In the South, the Border
States, and the Mountain West, rural Democrats often dominated at
the expense of urban Democrats:  Tennessee is typical of southern
stories.  Northeastern and midwestern states had the obverse pattern:
rural Republicans were overrepresented before the reapportionment
revolution.45  Connecticut, for example, prescribed in its 1818 consti-
tution that each town have at least one representative and no town
more than two.46  The small towns of Connecticut, which tended to
vote heavily Republican, were weighted more heavily than either of
the Democratic bastions of Hartford and New Haven, or the wealthy
Republican suburbs of New York City such as Stamford and Green-
wich.
thirty-seven percent of Tennessee voters electing twenty of the thirty-three state sena-
tors (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 253 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring))).
41
See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 347 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (per curiam) (three-
judge panel) (finding, on remand from the Supreme Court, that “the senatorial dis-
tricts in rural East Tennessee ha[d] on the average approximately double the voting
populations of the rural districts of Middle and West Tennessee, yet they receive[d] no
greater representation”).
42
Id.
43
See KEY, supra note 32, at 75 (describing the Tennessee political system as com-
posed of two one-party systems where the Republicans dominated eastern Tennessee
and the Democrats ruled the middle and western parts of the state).
44
TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1973-1974, at 273-79 (Rita A.
Whitfield ed., n.d.) (providing results for the 1972 Democratic primary for state legis-
lature); id. at 284-85 (giving county population data).
45
See Robert S. Erikson, Reapportionment and Policy:  A Further Look at Some Interven-
ing Variables, 219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 280, 289 (1973) [hereinafter Erikson, Reap-
portionment and Policy] (concluding that “preapportionment legislatures had overrepre-
sented rural and (in the North) Republican areas”); see also Erikson, supra note 9, at 58
(acknowledging that the Democratic Party was concentrated in urban areas in the
North and stood to gain from reapportionment there).
46
See MCKAY, supra note 1, at 294-95 (describing Connecticut’s apportionment
scheme after 1818).
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B. How Did the Changing Geographic Composition of the State
Legislatures Alter the Parties?
We examined survey responses to the NES, which included a
range of questions concerning ideology and public policy from 1952
to 1968.47  The issues included social welfare, government guaranteed
jobs, labor unions, healthcare, aid to schools, regulation of the econ-
omy, segregation, civil rights, and religion.  As with the party identifi-
cation measures, we standardized each measure (i.e., we subtracted
the mean and divided by the standard error).  The parties showed
markedly different patterns.
Consider, first, the Democrats.  Table 2 presents the attitudes ex-
pressed by self-identified Democrats within each of the four regions
and across localities on a range of domestic policy issues as well as
general ideology.  We denote in bold any questions that differ signifi-
cantly across localities within a region.
47
See supra note 14.
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Table 2:  Attitudes by Region and Type of Locality from
National Election Studies, 1952-1968, Democrats48
Northeast North Central South West
Item
U S R U S R U S R U S R
Ideology 36 22 25 44 26 18 13 18 -2 27 36 26
Power of federal gov’t 53 53 43 42 54 24 23 23 -3 51 28 39
Social welfare 48 30 26 39 7 12 -0 -3 -6 25 54 39
Healthcare 54 28 44 30 21 4 15 10 21 14 18 31
School aid I 48 32 6 27 29 -1 -1 -10 -5 23 22 19
School aid II 45 25 11 49 29 -5 38 23 0 22 41 19
Gov’t and jobs 49 4 2 36 14 -9 27 -5 17 24 16 20
Regulation 25 24 7 23 27 24 11 -1 14 38 42 62
Labor influence 65 22 18 16 17 -18 32 -12 5 -9 14 16
Labor thermometer 44 31 14 51 16 17 15 13 0 30 35 16
School integration I 43 35 4 29 13 5 -32 -46 -61 49 36 27
School integration II 54 31 36 28 13 -3 12 -7 -53 36 34 24
Segregation I 50 -0 3 23 -9 -25 26 -4 -54 53 13 25
Segregation II 34 21 39 22 -8 -9 -5 -12 -52 30 1 -1
Civil rights I 39 -7 -4 46 -1 -9 44 20 -18 42 6 11
Civil rights II 45 -0 24 34 5 -7 37 11 -8 49 12 11
Religious schools 28 41 86 59 1 5 21 32 29 -8 -43 4
School prayer 25 -13 -18 -3 4 25 -31 -18 -34 16 17 68
Truth of Bible 29 -13 -10 -11 2 -17 -45 -4 -46 -9 31 19
Income -2 19 -2 10 25 -21 -9 2 -35 -2 2 -7
The first row of Table 2 bears a familiar pattern.  Northeastern
and North Central urban Democrats were the left wing of their party
in the 1950s and 1960s, and southern Democrats were the right wing.
Indeed, rural southern Democrats were the most conservative group
within their party.  In the Northeast and North Central, reapportion-
ment led to increased representation of liberals.  However, in the
West and South, there was no statistically significant difference on
general ideology within the parties.
48
Table 2 is based on our analysis of data provided by the NES 1948-2002
CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 25.  The sample includes all respondents who iden-
tified themselves as strong or weak Democrats.  The entries give the expected score on
an item, where all items have been normalized to have a mean of 0.0 and standard de-
viation of 100, de-trended.  For example, a score of 50 means one-half of one standard
deviation above the overall mean on the item.  Higher scores denote a more “liberal”
position on the item.  The bold items are for cases where the F-test of the hypothesis
on no-difference between urban (U), suburban (S), and rural (R) respondents is rejec-
tion at the 0.05 level.
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Looking at specific questions of domestic policy reveals a deep
split between urban and rural Democrats throughout the country.  On
a range of economic and social welfare policies, urban Democrats
were substantially more liberal than their rural and suburban coun-
terparts within their own party.  These differences were most pro-
nounced in the Northeast and North Central.  To the extent that the
Democratic party reflected the preferences of its voters, reapportion-
ment likely moved the Democrats to the left on social welfare and
other domestic issues, especially in the Northeast and North Central.
In the West, urban and rural Democrats showed no significant divi-
sions or differences on social and economic policies.
The great divide within the Democratic party came over racial
politics:  school integration, desegregation, and civil rights.  In all re-
gions, urban Democrats were substantially more liberal than rural and
suburban Democrats.  The division was deepest in the South, where
the difference between urban and rural Democrats on support for
civil rights legislation, school integration, and general desegregation
was greatest.  Battles over these issues arose long before Baker, but, at
least within the Democratic party, reapportionment shifted political
weight in the liberal direction at the time that implementation of in-
tegrationist policies was truly taking hold.49
In stark contrast to the Democrats, urban, suburban, and rural
Republicans within each of the regions were divided over few issues.
Table 3 parallels Table 2, but the subset of respondents consists of
Republican party identifiers.  Very few issues produced statistically
significant differences between the overrepresented rural areas and
the underrepresented suburban and urban areas among Republican
voters.  In the West and North Central, only four out of thirty-eight
questions showed statistically significant differences across locales.  To
the extent that geography correlated with policy preference, those dif-
ferences appeared in the South and Northeast.
49
On the timing of integration, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-71 (1991).
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Table 3:  Attitudes by Region and Type of Locality from
National Election Studies, 1952-1968, Republicans50
Northeast North Central South West
Item
U S R U S R U S R U S R
Ideology -35 -18 -30 -37 -31 -49 -59 -47 -39 -48 -57 -37
Power of federal gov’t -19 -12 -31 -54 -38 -41 -88 -63 -54 -73 -54 -50
Social welfare -16 6 -20 -17 -58 -71 -17 -30 -3 -23 -26 -43
Healthcare 3 -34 -23 -46 -70 -49 -70 -39 -11 -14 -52 -70
School aid I 39 -22 -28 -25 -50 -39 -27 -17 7 2 -41 -24
School aid II -14 -41 -54 -32 -34 -42 1 -57 -19 -51 -47 -53
Gov’t and jobs 2 -21 -29 -23 -38 -34 -53 -35 16 -20 -47 -32
Regulation -21 -36 -20 -47 -42 -19 -87 -35 -13 -17 -14 -38
Labor influence 10 -19 -8 -13 6 -27 6 -29 4 -28 -41 -46
Labor thermometer -12 -23 -15 -22 -33 -35 -35 -31 -1 -50 -47 -67
School integration I 26 26 1 7 8 1 -10 -42 -34 53 17 49
School integration II 11 11 18 -4 -11 -5 -36 -33 -56 2 -11 6
Segregation I 20 13 10 3 -9 8 -9 -27 -55 14 30 32
Segregation II 14 10 37 12 7 -0 -32 -34 -69 28 19 24
Civil rights I -17 -16 -17 1 5 -18 -32 -19 -31 1 -25 2
Civil rights II -1 -20 -24 -42 -26 -27 4 -54 -9 -14 -51 -41
Religious schools 30 -35 -32 -43 -55 -32 -71 -13 26 -51 -32 -60
School prayer -22 -21 -33 14 3 -8 -42 -18 -36 5 54 23
Truth of Bible 42 3 -6 15 12 -18 38 18 -20 40 59 33
Income 12 37 11 26 35 -13 -6 22 -53 7 44 19
Like their Democratic counterparts, urban and suburban Repub-
licans in the Northeast were, on the whole, more liberal than rural
Republicans in the Northeast.  Urban Republicans in the Northeast
gave relatively liberal answers to questions about health care, school
aid, government guaranteed jobs, school integration, and religion.
Indeed, these Republicans offered policy opinions that were more lib-
eral than those of the nation as a whole, though they considered
themselves to be conservative.  Malapportionment effectively reduced
the weight of these voters within the Republican party in the North-
50
As with the other tables, the data in Table 3 are derived from the NES 1948-
2002 CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 25.  The sample includes all respondents who
identified themselves as strong or weak Republicans.  Entries give the expected score
on each item, where all items have been normalized to have a mean of 0.0 and a stan-
dard deviation of 100, de-trended.  For example, a score of 50 means one-half of one
standard deviation above the overall mean on the item.  Higher scores denote a more
“liberal” position on the item.  The bold items are for cases where the F-test of the hy-
pothesis of no-difference between urban (U), suburban (S), and rural (R) respondents
is rejected at the 0.05 level.
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east, especially in states like Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island, where there was substantial urban Repub-
lican strength.
Within the GOP, southern Republicans, though a rare breed,
showed the greatest divisions among the four regions.  Republicans
were most numerous in Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia during the
1950s and 1960s.  The issues that separated urban and rural Republi-
cans in the South were not racial matters, but questions about domes-
tic social and economic policy.  The division runs counter to the more
common pattern, in which urban voters are more liberal.  Urban and
suburban Republicans in the South expressed much more conservative
attitudes than their rural counterparts on health care, school aid, gov-
ernment guaranteed jobs, economic regulation, and the power of the
federal government. In their general ideological orientation, urban
Republicans in the South had the most conservative identification of
all groups.
In some southern states, reapportionment immediately benefited
urban Republicans.  Again, consider Tennessee.  Shelby County held
at-large elections for its eight lower house seats.  Democrats nearly al-
ways won those seats in the 1950s, though not without clear Republi-
can opposition.51  The districts created by the Democratic state legisla-
ture following reapportionment returned equal numbers of
Republicans and Democrats from Shelby County and Memphis.52
Comparing the two major parties, it is evident that malappor-
tionment affected the composition of the two major parties differ-
ently.  Underrepresentation of urban areas lessened the political
weight of urban, more liberal Democrats in all regions of the country,
except perhaps the West.  Locale had less of a clear relationship to the
policy preferences of Republican identifiers.  There is almost no asso-
ciation between geography and ideology among western and midwest-
ern Republicans.  In the South, urban Republicans, who tended to be
underrepresented, were more conservative than rural Republicans,
and in the Northeast, urban Republicans tended to be somewhat
more liberal than rural and suburban Republicans.
51
See TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 196 (1960) (listing winners of
the 1960 elections for state representative in Shelby County); TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE,
TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 302 (1958) (same for 1958); TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE
BLUE BOOK 406 (1956) (same for 1956).
52
TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 44, at 31-62, 254.
2004] REAPPORTIONMENT AND PARTY REALIGNMENT 451
III. IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS
The internal party divisions provide part of the answer to one of
the puzzles with which we began:  why was there little policy change as
a result of reapportionment?  The parties are important in organizing
legislatures.  Because the parties were affected differently in the dif-
ferent regions, any ideological shift was, at best, uneven.  How did
these internal party divisions net out in the electorate as a whole?  Ta-
ble 4 parallels Tables 2 and 3, but presents the data for all respon-
dents.
Table 4:  Attitudes by Region and Type of Locality from
National Election Studies, 1952-1968, All Respondents53
Northeast North Central South West
Item
U S R U S R U S R U S R
Ideology 23 -2 -6 24 1 -9 -2 -9 -13 5 3 5
Power of federal gov’t 31 15 -2 7 8 -5 -7 -16 -19 15 -10 8
Social welfare 17 23 -9 19 -31 -22 -1 -7 -6 10 1 16
Healthcare 39 -4 -1 4 -17 -23 -4 -10 14 5 -8 -2
School aid I 41 0 -15 13 -12 -14 -4 -10 -1 10 -2 3
School aid II 25 -3 -18 12 6 -18 17 -11 -5 11 4 -7
Gov’t and jobs 30 -9 -20 13 -11 -21 11 -16 16 5 -14 3
Regulation 8 -12 -14 1 -16 -1 -10 -13 5 16 21 33
Labor influence 31 -1 6 8 4 -19 22 -20 2 -19 -6 -4
Labor thermometer 26 0 2 21 -8 -11 2 -7 -6 -5 -6 1
School integration I 36 25 9 20 12 3 -19 -47 -50 48 30 34
School integration II 40 19 23 21 7 -0 -3 -20 -55 27 17 18
Segregation I 35 20 40 20 1 -1 -11 -20 -55 31 6 5
Segregation II 35 20 40 20 1 -1 -11 -20 -55 31 6 5
Civil rights I 22 -10 -7 26 0 -12 27 -7 -23 25 -6 9
Civil rights II 32 -5 4 6 -5 -12 15 -16 -9 26 -13 4
Religious schools 36 -5 -1 9 -18 -13 -3 2 28 -15 -38 -6
School prayer 20 -10 -21 6 10 11 -26 -15 -33 22 38 47
Truth of Bible 41 11 1 2 10 -19 -15 6 -38 17 48 19
Income 5 31 8 18 34 -15 -8 7 -40 1 18 -0
53
Table 4, like Tables 2 and 3, contains our analysis of the data provided by the
NES 1948-2002 CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 25.  The entries give the expected
score on an item, where all items have been normalized to have a mean of 0.0 and
standard deviation of 100, de-trended. For example, a score of 50 means one-half of
one standard deviation above the overall mean on the item.  Higher scores denote a
more “liberal” position on the item.  The bold items are for cases where the F-test of
the hypothesis of no-difference between urban (U), suburban (S), and rural (R) re-
spondents is rejected at the 0.05 level.
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Urban voters in the Northeast and North Central were most lib-
eral within those regions.  In terms of their overall ideological identi-
fications, the typical urban voter was significantly more liberal than
the typical suburban or rural voter in those regions.  Suburban voters
were somewhat more liberal than urban voters.  Reapportionment,
then, shifted the voting weight in the liberal direction within the state
legislatures in these regions.
The relative liberalness of urban voters in the Northeast and
North Central was borne out consistently on other policy questions.
Urban voters were consistently more liberal than suburban voters,
who, in turn, were typically more liberal than rural voters.  Increasing
the representation of urban and suburban voters—e.g., of Stamford
and New Haven—shifted the median voter within the state legislatures
to the left during the 1960s.  Within the North the shift was especially
pronounced on questions of health care, school aid, government
guaranteed jobs, and, in the Northeast, religion.
As with the internal politics of the parties, the urban and rural ar-
eas of the West differed little.  The only consistent and significant dif-
ferences within this region appeared on the issues of school segrega-
tion and civil rights.  Urban voters in the West were much more liberal
than suburban and rural voters on these issues.
The southern electorate showed a somewhat different pattern.
On general ideology, the differences were slight, but rural southern-
ers did tend to express a slightly more conservative overall identity.
On moral and social issues, the South on the whole paralleled the
Northeast and North Central.  Though not as liberal as the nation as a
whole, urban and suburban areas in the South were much more lib-
eral than rural southern areas on issues of school integration, deseg-
regation, and civil rights.  Urban and suburban southerners also ex-
pressed more liberal opinions about religion in schools and the truth
of the Bible than their rural counterparts.  However, on domestic
economic policies and social welfare, there was no consistent differ-
ence between urban and rural southerners.  On some questions, such
as health care and economic regulation, rural southerners expressed
more liberal attitudes.  On government guaranteed jobs, urban south-
erners were more liberal.  And, suburban southerners often expressed
the most conservative views within their region on social welfare and
economic policy.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The answers to our two puzzles are, we hope, now evident.  The
expectation that Democrats would gain everywhere was based on the
false premise that the Democrats resided in the cities and the Repub-
licans in small towns and farms.  In fact, the party splits varied across
regions.  In the South, rural areas were relatively more Democratic
than urban areas; hence, malapportionment gave Democrats more
representation than they deserved.  In the Northeast and North Cen-
tral, Republicans received greater weight than their numbers justified.
Within regions the partisan differences across locales were massive,
but averaged across the country the Democratic party’s gains seem
modest.
Did reapportionment lead to partisan realignments within the re-
gions?  The answer is clearly yes.  Erikson’s study of the relationship
between seats and votes in state legislatures showed a distinctly Repub-
lican bias in the North and Midwest, which, in turn, produced a
Democratic gain.54  In the West, the pattern was uneven.  His sample
excluded the South.  We replicated his analysis for the southern states
where there was some party competition before 1964—Florida, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.  In each, there was an enormous
Democratic bias before 1966, which vanished after reapportionment.55
Reapportionment, as Erikson correctly observed, led to more party
competition throughout the country in state legislatures.
The consequent policy implications of reapportionment, also, dif-
fered between the North, the South, and the West.  On economic and
social welfare policy, reapportionment likely tilted the northeastern
and North Central state legislatures to the left.  In the West and
South, geography bore little relationship to policy preferences on
these issues.  Past research has tested whether public expenditures
and expenditures on social welfare programs grew throughout the
country as a result of reapportionment.56  The survey data suggest a
nuance to these findings.  We expect increases in social welfare spend-
ing and overall spending in the Northeast and North Central, but not
in the South and West.
54
See Erikson, supra note 9, at 62-63 tbl.1 (providing data showing Democratic
gains in selected state legislatures following reapportionment).
55
Results are available from the authors upon request.
56
See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 5, at 775 (showing that although reappor-
tionment affected the distribution of funds, increases in state transfers to counties were
not statistically significant overall).
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On racial matters—civil rights, segregation, and school integra-
tion—the survey data show that urban and suburban voters expressed
consistently more liberal attitudes than rural voters.  Reapportion-
ment in the mid-1960s, we believe, strengthened the political hand of
those attempting to implement racial integration policies within the
states.  Likewise, malapportionment served as an obstacle to integra-
tion and the civil rights movement.  The areas within states and within
the parties that expressed the greatest opposition to expanding civil
rights and integrating schools and other facilities had disproportion-
ate voting strength in state legislative elections and in the legislatures
themselves.  Importantly, Erikson found noticeable effects of reappor-
tionment on passage of civil rights legislation in the states.57
The long-term consequences of reapportionment are more diffi-
cult to divine.  Shifting policies and party positions may have subse-
quently changed people’s partisan attachments, leading to further
shifts in the positions of the parties and the policies produced by state
legislatures.
One dynamic to which reapportionment likely contributed was
the leftward movement of the Democratic parties within the states and
throughout the nation.  This shift was foreshadowed in our survey
data.  Urban Democrats were badly underrepresented in state legisla-
tures and, thus, within their party.  The newly elected legislators from
new urban seats in the late 1960s and early 1970s represented mark-
edly different constituencies than the rural seats they supplanted.
These new urban Democratic districts, the NES data reveal, were
much more liberal than the rural Democratic seats on civil rights,
school aid, government jobs, health care, labor relations, and, in the
Northeast and North Central, religion.
This shift contributed to the party realignments occurring within
the states, especially in the South.  Democrats dominated all regions
of the South from 1952 to 1968.  But urban Democratic southerners
were much more liberal, especially on racial issues, than rural Demo-
cratic southerners.  Reapportionment shifted seats from rural areas to
cities in most southern states.  And as the urban centers emerged as
the new core of the southern Democratic party, the party moved left
and lost many of its conservative rural adherents.  Over the long-term,
those voters appear to have moved into the Republican party.  Look-
ing again at the survey data reported in Table 1, party identifications
in the South changed as expected.  In the 1950s, according to the
57
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Erikson’s studies).
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NES data, urban, suburban, and rural voters held equally strong at-
tachments to the Democratic party.  In the 1960s, suburban voters
shifted toward the Republicans, but urban and rural southerners
maintained the same level of Democratic support they had in the
1950s.  In the 1970s, rural southerners began to leave the Democratic
party, and from the 1970s on, the partisanship of rural southerners re-
sembled that of suburban southerners, rather than urban southern-
ers.58
The urban Democratic electorate in the Northeast and Midwest
was also more liberal than the rural and suburban Democrats.  In
these regions, the new Democratic alignment in the state legislatures
was more liberal.  But the realignment in those regions differed from
the South.  The change worked not so much through the internal
workings of one party, but through the shift of seats from one party to
the other.  In the Northeast and Midwest, rural areas were staunchly
Republican, and those areas lost seats to the more Democratic subur-
ban and urban areas.  The differences among Republicans were less
dramatic in these regions than the differences among Democrats in
the South.  If anything, reapportionment of the Northeast and Mid-
west moved Republicans in these states slightly to the right (except
where religion was concerned).  But the Democrats also moved left.
Urban Democrats in the Northeast and Midwest experienced the most
gain in representation, and they were more liberal than rural Demo-
crats in these regions.  As a result, moderate northern Republicans,
who may have seen their party move right, were not more attracted to
the Democratic party, which had moved left.
Of course, reapportionment was only one of the factors contribut-
ing to the dramatic changes in American politics in the 1960s.  State
and national leaders also sought to create new programs to combat
poverty and improve public health and new legal guarantees of the
rights of all citizens.59  The Democratic Party, especially at the national
58
According to our analysis of the data provided by the NES 1948-2002 CU-
MULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 25, all southern voters have a score of about 5.4 on a
scale from 1.0 to 7.0 of strength of party, where 1.0 means strong Republican and 7.0
means strong Democrat.  In the 1960s, urban and rural southerners had a score of 5.2
and suburban southerners had a score of 4.7.  In the 1970s, urban southerners had a
score of 5.2, but rural and suburban southerners had a score of 4.6.  In the 1980s and
1990s, urban southerners had an average score of 5.0 (leaning Democratic), rural
southerners averaged 4.6, and suburban southerners averaged 4.3.  See generally EARLE
BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS (2002) (offering an ex-
tensive discussion of the shift in voting patterns and in the political elites in the South
that led to the rise of the Republican Party in the region).
59
See, e.g., KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 35-38 (1969)
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level, took the lead on these issues, and as the party made legislative
gains, it moved public policy and its reputation to the left.60
It is difficult to isolate the singular contribution of Baker to these
national changes.  In many ways, the portfolio of liberal court deci-
sions and legislation worked hand in hand to transform the Demo-
cratic Party.  Blacks gained representation through the Voting Rights
and Civil Rights Acts, and urban liberals gained representation
through the reapportionment cases.  But unlike the Great Society and
the Voting Rights Act, Baker did not uniformly affect one group or re-
distribute income.  Indeed, as with the party alignment within states,
the consequences of reapportionment at times worked against the na-
tional policy changes sought by the Democratic Party.  In many south-
ern states, reapportionment may have worked against black represen-
tation.  The density of blacks in the American South in the 1960s was
highest in the rural counties of the Black Belt.  Had rural representa-
tion remained disproportionately large in many southern state legisla-
tures, the Voting Rights Act may have increased African American
representation even more.
However it was viewed as a national issue, Baker had clear, but dif-
ferent, political effects on the four regions of the country.  It pulled
the state legislatures of the Northeast and Midwest toward the Demo-
crats; it pulled the state legislatures of the South toward the Republi-
cans.
We end with one unexpected, or ironic, consequence.  The reap-
portionment revolution produced a similar change in representation
in all state legislatures:  it increased representation of wealthier areas
at the expense of poorer areas.  Rural counties were overrepresented
in nearly every state at the expense of urban and suburban areas.
Baker ended rural dominance of state legislatures and their domi-
nance of state public finances.61  And rural counties are by far the
poorest in the United States.  The last row of Table 4 displays the
normalized income of the average survey respondent.  The suburban
areas in every state had higher income than rural areas; in the South
and Midwest the urban areas also had significantly higher income
(discussing the political effects of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs).
60
See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION:  RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989) (arguing that the parties’
views on race represent the most significant difference between them); PHILLIPS, supra
note 59 (charting more generally the sociopolitical realignment before Nixon’s elec-
tion in 1968).
61
See generally Ansolabehere et al., supra note 5 (analyzing the effects of the Su-
preme Court’s decision on the distribution of public expenditures).
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than the rural areas.  Reapportionment, then, lowered the political
power of the poorest areas of the country at exactly the same time that
the Great Society and the War on Poverty sought to increase the social
and economic well-being of poor Americans.
